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    ______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
    _______________ 
 
 
DIAMOND, District Judge 
 
 Edward M. Sullivan ("Sullivan") appeals an order of the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
granting summary judgment in favor of the United States and 
denying his motion for summary judgment.  Specifically, the 
district court upheld the Internal Revenue Service's ("IRS") 
assessment of a 100% penalty against Sullivan pursuant to §6672 
of the Internal Revenue Code on grounds that he was a responsible 
person who willfully failed to pay over federal employment taxes. 
Because we believe that the record before us does not establish 
Sullivan's liability as a matter of law, we will reverse and 
remand for a trial on the merits.   
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I. Background Facts0 
 In September 1984, Sullivan began working as president 
of Pat's International, Ltd. ("Pat's"), a company which operated 
fast food restaurants specializing in Philadelphia-style 
cheesesteaks.  Sullivan was hired by Robert P. Carrigan 
("Carrigan"), chairman of the board of directors and chief 
executive officer of Pat's.  Pursuant to his designation as 
president, Sullivan was responsible for (1) assisting Carrigan in 
raising capital for Pat's by meeting with potential investors; 
(2) managing restaurant operations; and (3) locating new 
restaurant sites.  Sullivan also was authorized to sign checks 
drawn from the company's payroll and general operating accounts. 
 In February or March 1985, Sullivan first became aware 
that Pat's was not current in its payment of quarterly employment 
taxes to the United States.0  During this same time period, 
Sullivan loaned Pat's $20,000.00, at the request of Carrigan, so 
that it could pay its creditors, including the IRS.  Sullivan 
took no steps, however, to ensure that the $20,000.00 was applied 
to the tax liability, even though he knew that other creditors 
were being paid ahead of the United States.  Sullivan was removed 
                                                           
0These facts are drawn exclusively from the parties' joint 
pretrial admissions and stipulations submitted to the district 
court. 
0The record also demonstrates that during his tenure as president 
of Pat's, Sullivan was aware that an employer has a duty to 
withhold and pay over to the United States the federal employment 
taxes of its employees.  Sullivan also was aware that those 
individuals responsible for the collection and payment of 
employment taxes, who failed to do so, could be held personally 




as president of Pat's in August 1985, and left the company the 
following month.   
 In April 1989, the IRS made an assessment against 
Sullivan in the amount of $83,060.78 pursuant to 26 U.S.C.A. 
§6672.0  The IRS charged that Sullivan willfully failed to 
account for and pay over to the United States federal employment 
taxes withheld from the wages of Pat's employees during the three 
quarters ending March 31, 1985, June 30, 1985, and September 30, 
1985.0   
 In October 1992, the United States filed a complaint in 
the district court seeking to reduce to judgment the assessments 
that had been made against Sullivan, Carrigan, and Fendrick 
                                                           
0This section provides in pertinent part: 
 
§6672. Failure to Collect and Pay Over Tax, 
Attempt to Evade or Defeat Tax. 
 
  (a) General Rule.  Any person required to 
collect, truthfully account for, and pay over 
any tax imposed by this title who willfully 
fails to collect such tax, or truthfully 
account for and pay over such tax, or 
willfully attempts in any manner to evade or 
defeat any such tax or the payment thereof, 
shall, in addition to other penalties 
provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal 
to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not 
collected, or not accounted for and paid 
over. 
 
26 U.S.C.A. §6672. 
0At the same time, the IRS made assessments in the amount of 
$204,820.33 against Carrigan and $102,661.00 against David 
Fendrick ("Fendrick"), chief financial officer of Pat's, for the 
four quarters ending March 30, 1985, through December 31, 1985.   
5 
pursuant to §6672.0  Thereafter, Sullivan filed an answer seeking 
dismissal of the complaint against him for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted, and also filed a 
counterclaim seeking a refund of $100.00 paid on account of the 
penalty assessed against him.0  Upon consideration of cross-
motions for summary judgment, the district court found that 
"[a]lthough Sullivan may not have always had the 'final' say 
about paying creditors, in the apocalyptic sense of the word," he 
was a responsible person under §6672 because (1) he had signature 
authority on the payroll and general operating accounts, which he 
exercised at least once in making a tax payment to the IRS; (2) 
he was president of Pat's; (3) he devoted significant time to 
raising capital for the company; and (4) he loaned the company 
$20,000.00 to pay creditors.  Further, the district court found 
that Sullivan willfully failed to pay over the withholding taxes 
because he was aware of the unpaid tax liability and that other 
creditors were being paid ahead of the IRS, yet failed to 
exercise his authority to ensure that the taxes were paid, either 
with the $20,000.00 that he personally loaned to Pat's or from 
the existing balances in the company's accounts on which he had 
signature authority.0   
                                                           
0Carrigan and Fendrick failed to plead or otherwise defend, and 
defaults were entered against them in this action on May 14, 
1993.  They are not parties to this appeal. 
0In February 1992, Sullivan paid $100.00 of the assessment made 
against him, and simultaneously filed a claim for refund and a 
request for abatement of the entire assessment.  The refund claim 
was denied by the IRS on May 8, 1992.  
0During the period that Sullivan was president and knew that the 
employment taxes were not being paid, there was a positive 
balance in the payroll account of no more than $9,856.61 and a 
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 The district court had jurisdiction over the parties' 
claims by virtue of 28 U.S.C.A. §§1340, 1345, and 1355 and 26 
U.S.C.A. §§7401 and 7402.  We have jurisdiction over the appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. §1291. 
 In reviewing the district court's grant of summary 
judgment we exercise plenary review and employ the same standard 
applicable in the district court.  Davis v. Portline Transportes 
Maritime, 16 F.3d 532, 536 (3d Cir. 1994).  We must consider all 
of the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party.  The moving party can prevail in its motion for 
summary judgment only if there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  Peters v. Delaware River Port Authority, 16 F.3d 1346, 1349 
(3d Cir. 1994).   
II.  Discussion 
 The question of Sullivan's liability under §6672 
presents two issues:  whether Sullivan is a responsible person 
and whether he willfully failed to collect, truthfully account 
for or pay over federal employment taxes.  As we have extensively 
discussed the standards for addressing these two issues before, 
we will only summarize their salient points.  We will first 
address the responsible person issue. 
 
A. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
positive balance in the general operating account of no more than 
$132,770.43. 
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 A person responsible under §6672 is a person required 
to collect, truthfully account for or pay over any tax due to the 
United States.  Brounstein v. United States, 979 F.2d 952, 954 
(3d Cir. 1992).  "Responsibility is a matter of status, duty, or 
authority, not knowledge."  Quattrone Accountants, Inc. v. IRS, 
895 F.2d 921, 927 (3d Cir. 1990).  A responsible person need not 
have exclusive control over the company's finances, he need only 
have significant control.  United States v. Vespe, 868 F.2d 1328, 
1332 (3d Cir. 1989).  "A person has significant control if he has 
the final or significant word over which bills or creditors get 
paid."  Quattrone, 895 F.2d at 927.  In determining whether an 
individual is a responsible person, courts also consider other 
factors.  These include:  (1) the duties of the officer as 
outlined by the corporate by-laws; (2) the ability of the 
individual to sign checks of the corporation; (3) the taxpayer's 
signature on the employer's federal employment or other tax 
returns; (4) the identity of the officers, directors and 
shareholders of the corporation; (5) the identity of the 
individuals who hired and fired employees; and (6) the identity 
of the individual(s) who were in charge of the financial affairs 
of the corporation.  Brounstein, 979 F.2d at 954-55.   
 Applying the foregoing principles to the present case, 
we find that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning 
whether Sullivan had "significant control" over Pat's financial 
affairs.  Although the undisputed evidence in this record 
establishes that Sullivan functioned as the president of Pat's, 
exercised his signature authority on one occasion to sign a 
8 
corporate check which was applied to Pat's tax liabilities, and 
devoted a significant amount of his time to raising capital for 
the company, the undisputed evidence also indicates that 
Sullivan's control over Pat's financial affairs was significantly 
circumscribed by Carrigan and Fendrick.  As the district court 
stated in its opinion: 
  It is undisputed that Sullivan did not have 
exclusive control over the management of 
Pat's.  Both parties agree that defendants 
Carrigan and Fendrick were responsible 
persons who willfully failed to collect and 
pay Pat's withholding taxes.  Defendant 
Carrigan was responsible for handling 
financial affairs.  Defendant David Fendrick, 
Chief Financial Officer, maintained all of 
Pat's books, records, and bank accounts. 
Defendants Carrigan and Fendrick handled all 
creditors' inquiries and bills.  Defendant 
Fendrick prepared and filed all federal 
income and employment tax returns.  Defendant 
Fendrick also directed all negotiations with 
the IRS regarding the unpaid tax liabilities. 
Sullivan did not participate in any meetings 
with the IRS. 
 
  Additionally, Sullivan did not own stock in 
Pat's, he never signed Pat's tax returns, he 
never negotiated with creditors on behalf of 
Pat's, and he had no independent authority to 
hire or fire employees without the consent of 
defendant Carrigan. 
 
  Sullivan was authorized to sign checks on 
behalf of Pat's with respect to the payroll 
account and the general operating account. 
However, the corporate books, records and 
checkbooks were locked in an office, and 
Sullivan did not have his own key.  He signed 
only one check on behalf of the company.  In 
July 1985, Sullivan signed a corporate check 
in the amount of $9,451.61 which was applied 
to Pat's outstanding tax liabilities for the 
third quarter of 1985. 
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 In light of the foregoing facts that Sullivan was not 
responsible for handling the financial affairs of the company, 
did not prepare, maintain, or have access to any of the corporate 
books, records or checkbooks, did not prepare or sign any 
corporate tax returns, and did not handle any creditors' bills or 
inquiries nor negotiate with any creditor on behalf of Pat's, it 
cannot be said as a matter of law that he had significant control 
of the company's financial affairs.  Based on all the evidence of 
record, we hold that a reasonable jury could find that Sullivan 
was not a responsible person.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242 (1986).  We conclude, therefore, that the district 
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the United 
States on this issue. 
 
B. 
 We next consider whether Sullivan willfully failed to 
truthfully account for and pay over the taxes due.  The term 
willfulness has been interpreted broadly to encompass a range of 
actions by responsible persons.  Generally, willfulness is a 
"voluntary, conscious and intentional decision to prefer other 
creditors over the Government."  Quattrone, 895 F.2d at 928.  In 
this regard, "a responsible person acts willfully if he pays 
other creditors in preference to the IRS knowing that taxes are 
due."  Id.  A responsible person also acts willfully if he 
demonstrates a reckless disregard for whether taxes have been 
paid.  Vespe, 868 F.2d at 1335.  The "reckless disregard" 
standard is met if the taxpayer "'(1) clearly ought to have known 
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that (2) there was a grave risk that withholding taxes were not 
being paid and if (3) he was in a position to find out for 
certain very easily.'"  Id. (quoting Wright v. United States, 809 
F.2d 425, 427 (7th Cir. 1987)). 
 Applying these principles to the instant case, we find 
that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether 
Sullivan willfully failed to pay over the taxes due.  Although 
the record establishes that Sullivan lent the company $20,000.00 
to pay its creditors, including the IRS, but took no other steps 
to direct that the tax liability be paid, the record also 
establishes that the one check that Sullivan did sign as 
president of Pat's, a check for $9,451.61, was paid to the IRS. 
 Additionally, the record before us is not clear 
concerning whether the check to the IRS came from the funds lent 
by Sullivan or from some other source.  The record is equally 
unclear about how much tax was due when Sullivan signed the check 
to the IRS.  Likewise, the record does not indicate what 
knowledge Sullivan had concerning Pat's tax liability when he 
made the $20,000.00 loan.  Given his admittedly limited access to 
the company's tax and other financial records, Sullivan may not 
have acted with reckless disregard of whether the taxes were 
being paid when he took no steps to direct that the $20,000.00 be 
applied exclusively to Pat's tax liability.  In light of all the 
evidence, we believe that a reasonable jury could find that 
Sullivan did not willfully fail to pay over the taxes due.  We 
conclude, therefore, that the district court erred in granting 




III.  Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 
court granting summary judgment for the United States will be 
reversed and the case will be remanded for further proceedings 








     
       
                                                           
0Sullivan also has appealed the denial of his motion for summary 
judgment.  Because we have determined that there is a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding Sullivan's liability under 
§6672, we hold that the district court did not err in denying his 
motion for summary judgment. 
